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Abstract—We study the problem of verifiable polynomial
evaluation in the user-server and multi-party setups. We propose
INTERPOL, an information-theoretically verifiable algorithm
that allows a user to delegate the evaluation of a polynomial
to a server, and verify the correctness of the results with high
probability and in sublinear complexity. Compared to the existing
approaches which typically rely on cryptographic assumptions,
INTERPOL stands out in that it does not assume any compu-
tational limitation on the server. INTERPOL relies on decompo-
sition of polynomial evaluation into two matrix multiplications,
and injection of computation redundancy in the form of locally
computed parities with secret coefficients for verification. We
show that INTERPOL has several desirable properties such as
adaptivity and public verifiability. Furthermore, by generalizing
INTERPOL to a multi-party setting consisting of a network of n
untrusted nodes, where each node is interested in evaluating the
same polynomial, we demonstrate that we can achieve an overall
computational complexity comparable to a trusted setup, while
guaranteeing information-theoretic verification at each node.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud and edge computing are rapidly growing in popularity
by enabling users to simply offload their compute-intensive
tasks via the Internet. But, how can we make sure that the
computations are done correctly in the cloud? For example,
there may be dishonest servers in the cloud that may return
plausible (and potentially misleading) results without perform-
ing the actual work. This critical problem has motivated the
formalization of Verifiable Computation, which is to enable
offloading of computations to untrusted servers while main-
taining verifiable results (e.g., [1], [2]).
More specifically, as depicted in Figure 1, in the problem
of verifiable computing a user is interested in evaluating f(x).
After some preprocessing, he will reveal a function f˜ and
an input value x˜ to the server. The server will be in charge
of returning m = f˜(x˜). Given a returned value mˆ, the user
must be able to (i) verify that indeed mˆ = f˜(x˜), and (ii)
recover the value of f(x). He must be able to perform both
of these tasks in substantially smaller complexity than the
original computation of f(x).
The problem of verifiable computation has a rich history in
the literature. A large body of work focuses on computation of
arbitrary functions, by relying on Interactive Proofs [3], Prob-
abilistically Checkable Proofs [4], [5], Fully Homomorphic
Encryption [1], or converting arithmetic circuits into Quadratic
Arithmetic Programs [6], [7]. Despite their theoretical beauty,
many of these works are still far from being practically
implementable. As a result, there has been several recent
efforts to address the computation of specific functions which
,
User Server
• Compute f(x) with
the help of server.
• Verify its correctness.
Fig. 1. Illustration of verifiable computation, in which a user wishes to offload
the computation of f(x) to a server, and efficiently verify the correctness of
the results.
are of popular demand, such as polynomial evaluation and
matrix multiplication [8], [9], [2]. The focus of this line of
work is to present algorithms which can be implemented and
provide satisfactory performance guarantees, at the expense of
generality.
Our main contribution in this paper is the development of a
new algorithm, named INTERPOL1, for verifiable polynomial
computing. The distinguishing feature of INTERPOL is that
it does not rely on any cryptographic assumption. As a result,
even a computationally unbounded adversarial server, or one
equipped with a quantum computer cannot compromise the
security of the system. To the best of our knowledge, INTER-
POL is the first information-theoretically secure algorithm for
verifiable polynomial computation.
To accomplish this, we first transform the problem of
polynomial evaluation to two matrix multiplications, the first
performed by the server and the second by the user. The
complexity of the first matrix multiplication is linear in k,
where k is the degree of the polynomial that needs to be
evaluated. Hence, the complexity of the server remains the
same as that of a polynomial computation. On the other hand,
the complexity of the second matrix multiplication, which is
done by the user, is only O(
√
k). Furthermore, we provide a
simple mechanism for the user to verify the correctness of
the first matrix multiplication by performing several parity
checks with secret coefficients. This verification too can be
done in O(
√
k). As a result, the overall complexity of the
1INTERPOL stands for information theoretically verifiable polynomial
evaluation
user will be O(
√
k), which is much smaller than evaluating
the polynomial. The security of INTERPOL merely relies on
hiding the secret coefficients of the parity checks from the
server, and thus cannot be compromised by a computationally
unbounded server.
The second feature of INTERPOL is that it is publicly
verifiable [10], in the sense that not only the user, but any
other node in the network can perform the verification and
decide whether the result of computation is correct. This
property allows us to extend our results to a network of n
nodes where all the nodes are interested in evaluating the
same polynomial at a given input. This setup is indeed very
common, for instance in the context of blockchain, where
all the full nodes in the network examine a newly mined
block to check the validity of the transactions included therein.
This process can be formulated as a polynomial evaluation
[11] which can be captured by our model. Our approach to
this problem is as follows. We require each node to perform
a small part of the computation. The nodes then exchange
these intermediate results and verify the correctness of the
results provided by other nodes in the network. Following
this procedure, and assuming that the number of nodes in the
network is substantially smaller than the dimensionality of the
problem, we can reduce the overall computational complexity
of the network by a factor of n, compared to the scenario
where each node performs the computation individually.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
A user wishes to delegate the computation of a polynomial
f(x) of degree k over some finite field Fq , at a series of
input values x ∈ {x1, . . . , xmax} to a server. We assume that
both f and the set {x1, x2, . . . , xmax} are known globally.
The user must be able to verify, with high probability and in
low complexity, the correctness of the result provided by the
server. We consider an amortized model [1] where the user
can afford to perform a one-time computionally heavy task.
A commonly-adapted assumption in the literature is that the
number of input values at which we are interested in evaluating
f(x) is so large that this initialization cost becomes negligible
per round.
Let us represent the overall complexity of the user for one
round of computation by C, and let P be the probability of
error of the user, i.e., the probability that he would accept a
false result as valid. We are interested in characterizing the
tradeoff between P and C. In particular, our goal is to achieve
a C which is sublinear in the degree of the polynomial, and a
probability of error that vanishes as the field size grows large.
We will now make these definitions precise.
The initialization phase: The user generates a random
variable v according to some distribution PV and computes
(s, f˜) = encini(f, v). He keeps s private but reveals f˜ to the
server.
At round i: The user wishes to recover f(xi). The com-
putation is done in three steps.
• The user computes x˜i = enc(xi, ui) for some random
variable ui independent of v and u[i−1], with marginal
...
Initialization
At the end of each round
• Compute f(x) = dec().
• Verify correctness.
Fig. 2. Illustration of various stages of verifiable computing. Initialization:
the user generates a random variable v, and computes (s, f˜) = encini(f, v).
He keeps s private, but reveals f˜ to the server. At round i: the user generates
a random variable ui and computes x˜i = enc(xi, ui). He reveals x˜i to the
server and demands the computation of f˜(x˜i). Once he receives the response
from the server, he verifies the correctness of the result, and subsequently
recovers f(x).
distribution PU . He reveals x˜i to the server and requests
the computation of w = f˜(x˜i).
• The server then returns a possibly randomized function
wˆ = comp(f˜ , f, x˜[i], x[max]). (1)
• The user computes two functions. First, a verification bit
b = ver(wˆ, s, f, xi) is computed. If b = 0, the user rejects
the result of the computation. Otherwise, he will aim at
recovering the evaluation of f at x by computing rˆ =
dec(wˆ, s, f, xi). He will accept rˆ = r = f(xi).
The algorithm described above must satisfy the following
properties.
• Correctness: If the server is honest, and wˆ = w,
then the verification process must pass and the user
must be able to recover f(x). In other words, for any
x ∈ {x1, x2, . . . , xmax} we must have
dec(w, s, f, x) = f(x), (2)
ver(w, s, f, x) = 1. (3)
• (Information-Theoretic) Soundness: If the server is
dishonest, the verification process must fail with high
probability. More formally, suppose at round i the server
returns wˆ 6= f˜(x˜) where wˆ could only depend on
x˜[i], x[max], f˜ and f . Then, with high probability we
must have ver(wˆ, s, f, xi) = 0. In other words, P = o(1)
where
P
△
= max
f,x[max],comp(·)
P(ver(wˆ, s, f, xi) = 1|wˆ 6= w).
The term o(1) must vanish as the size of the field q grows
large. Note that we are considering a worst case scenario
over all possible functions comp(·). This implies that
the soundness property must be information-theoretic: it
must hold for any server, regardless of his computational
budget.
• Efficient Verification and Recovery: The entire process
of encoding the input, recovering the value of f(x) from
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Fig. 3. In multi-party verifiable computation, each pair of nodes can be
viewed as two user-server instances. For each instance, one node performs
the computation and the other verifies the result.
w and verifying the result of the computation must be
substantially easier than performing the original poly-
nomial evaluation. More formally, define cenc, cver and
cdec as the maximum complexity of computing enc(x, u),
ver(w, s, f, x) and dec(w, s, f, x) respectively. This max-
imum is taken over all polynomials of degree k over
Fq and all possible set of input values. We must have
C = o(k) where
C △= cenc + cver + cdec. (4)
• Efficient Computation: Even though we do not assume
any limitation on the computation power of the server,
we require the complexity of computing f˜(x˜) to be
comparable to the complexity of computing f(x). More
precisely, we require that cf˜ = O˜(k), where O˜ can hide a
polylogarithmic term. Imposing this (or a slightly looser)
restriction is crucial in designing practical algorithms.
Given the requirements above, we ask what is the tradeoff
between the parameters P and C among all possible strategies
that achieve cf˜ = O˜(k).
A. Multi-party setup
As a secondary model, we consider a network of n nodes
which are all interested in computing f(x) over a series of
input values. We assume that f(·) and the set of inputs are pub-
licly known. Furthermore, k ≫ n, that is, the dimensionality
of the problem is much larger than the number of nodes in the
network. In its general form, we can decompose the network
into n(n−1) user-server pairs {(ℓ, j), ℓ ∈ [n], j ∈ [n], ℓ 6= j}.
For each pair (ℓ, j), node j will be in charge of computing
a specific task and server ℓ will verify the correctness of the
result.
Initialization: Each node ℓ generates a random variable vℓ
based on some distribution PVℓ and computes (sℓ, f˜ℓ,[n]\{ℓ}) =
encℓ,ini(f, v). If node ℓ is honest, we assume that vℓ is
independent of (v[n]\{ℓ}). Dishonest nodes may collude and
choose their random variables based on some joint distribution.
Each honest node ℓ keeps sℓ private. Each node ℓ reveal
f˜ℓ,[n]\{ℓ} to everyone.
At round i: Each node ℓ wishes to recover f(xi).
• Node ℓ computes x˜i,ℓ,[n]\{ℓ} = encℓ(xi, ui,ℓ) for some
random variables ui,ℓ. He then broadcasts x˜i,ℓ,[n]\{ℓ} to
all the nodes in the network. Node j will be in charge of
computing wℓ,j = f˜ℓ,j(x˜i,ℓ,j) for all ℓ ∈ [n]\{j}.
• Node j will computes a possibly randomized function
wˆ[n]\{j},j = comp(f˜[n],[n], f, x˜[i],[n],[n], x[max], vj , u[i],j)
and broadcasts the result of computation to every node
in the network.
• Each node ℓ computes two functions. First, a verifi-
cation string of bits bℓ,j = verℓ,j(wˆℓ,[n]\{ℓ}, sℓ, f, xi)
for j ∈ [n]\{ℓ} is computed. If there exists some
j ∈ [n]\{ℓ} such that bℓ,j = 0, node ℓ will reject the
result of computation provided by node j. Otherwise,
he will aim at recovering the evaluation of f at x by
computing rˆ = decℓ(wˆℓ,[n]\{ℓ}, sℓ, f, xi). He will accept
rˆ = r = f(x).
The algorithm must satisfy the correctness and soundness
properties defined similarly to the user-server setup.
• Correctness:
decℓ(wℓ,[n]\{ℓ}, sℓ, f, x) = f(x), ∀ℓ (5)
verℓ(wℓ,[n]\{ℓ}, sℓ, f, x) = 1, ∀ℓ. (6)
• (Information-Theoretic) Soundness: P = o(1) where
Pℓ,j △= max
f,x[max],comp(·)
P(verℓ,j(wˆℓ,[n]\{ℓ}, sℓ, f, xi)
= 1|wˆℓ,j 6= wℓ,j)
and P = maxℓ,j Pℓ,j . In particular, this property must
hold regardless of the number of malicious nodes in the
network and their state of collusion.
For this model, we are interested in characterizing the trade-
off between P and the worst-case complexity of the nodes,
C = max
ℓ
[cencℓ + cf˜[n]\{ℓ},ℓ +
∑
j
cverℓ,j + cdecℓ ].
III. MAIN RESULTS
The first contribution of this work is to propose INTER-
POL, an algorithm that allows a user to recover the evaluation
of a polynomial f(x) = a0 + a1x + · · · + ak−1xk−1 in
complexity O(
√
k) with the help of a server. Furthermore, the
user can verify the correctness of the computation provided
by the server in O(c
√
k) for some constant c. Essential to the
correctness of INTERPOL is the widely adapted assumption
of amortized cost: the user is allowed to perform a one-time
heavy computation knowing that this cost will break down
over the evaluations of f(x) at x ∈ {x1, x2, . . . , xmax}, and
can be neglected [1].
Theorem 1. There exists an algorithm which allows a user to
compute a polynomial f(·) of degree k over Fq at an input x
with the help of a server, which has the following properties.
• The user can verify the correctness of the results provided
by the server with an error probability of 1qc , where c is
an arbitrary constant chosen by the user.
• The computation complexities of the user and the server
are O(c
√
k) and O(k) respectively.
Remark 1. To prove Theorem 1, we propose INTERPOL,
presented in Section IV, which relies on decomposition of
polynomial evaluation into two matrix multiplications and
injection of computation redundancy in the form of locally
computed parities with secret coefficients.
Remark 2. The verification process used in INTERPOL is
information-theoretic as opposed to the cryptographic ap-
proach that is commonly adapted in the literature. This means
that even a computationally unbounded adversarial server will
not be able to compromise the security of the system.
Remark 3. Another important property of INTERPOL is its
adaptivity [2]. This refers to the fact that the algorithm remains
secure even when the adversarial server knows whether the
user has accepted or rejected his responses to the previous
queries. We will see in Section IV-B that the probability that a
server who receives such feedback can bypass the verification
test at least once in m rounds of computation is mqc . Note that
this is only a marginal increase compared to an elementary
server who receives no feedback at all, and who chooses to
returnm random outputs in response to them queries, thereby,
achieving a probability of success of 1− (1− 1qc )m.
Remark 4. INTERPOL is publicly verifiable. This means that
not only the user but any other node in the network will be
able to verify the correctness of the results, without having to
trust the user or the server.
The fact that INTERPOL is publicly verifiable enables us
to generalize our results to a multi-party setting as our second
contribution. We propose an algorithm that allows every node
in a network of n nodes to recover, with high confidence, the
result of a polynomial f(x).
Theorem 2. For the multi-party setup in Section II-A, there
exists a distributed algorithm which allows each node in a
network of n nodes to compute a polynomial f(·) of degree k
over Fq at an input x, with the following properties.
• Each node can verify the correctness of the final result
with an error probability of 1qc , where c is an arbitrary
constant.
• The computation complexity of each node is O( kn +
cn
√
k).
Remark 5. To prove Theorem 2, we propose a multi-party vari-
ation of INTERPOL, presented in Section V, which divides
the task of polynomial evaluation into n parallel tasks, each
performed by one user and verified by the remaining users,
following a similar approach to the user-server setup.
Remark 6. In the absence of trust, a naive (but common)
approach is for each node in the network to individually
compute f(x), which implies an overall complexity of O(kn).
By contrast, our approach only requires O( kn ) computation
per node, or O(k) computation overall.2 Given that O(k)
computation is needed for evaluating an arbitrary polynomial
of degree k, we can observe that our algorithm is order-wise
as efficient as in a trusted setup.
Remark 7. Our multi-party algorithm can be directly applied
to a blockchain network, where all the full nodes wish to verify
the validity of a newly mined block of transactions. Without
loss of generality, one can model this process as a polynomial
evaluation task [11]. As the length of the distributed ledger
increases, this process grows in complexity. Our multi-party
algorithm proposes a natural solution to this problem. Instead
of individually validating the blocks, nodes in the network
divide the task of polynomial evaluation among themselves.
Subsequently, each node carries out a small amount of com-
putation in order to validate the results provided by the other
nodes. If it is detected that a node has provided false results,
other nodes can simply redo the computation and prohibit the
malicious node from participating in the following rounds.
A. Comparison with Prior Works
The problem of verifiable computation has a rich his-
tory. Here, we suffice to address the works which are more
prominent or closely related to our contribution. One of the
first non-interactive verifiable computation algorithms was
proposed in [1]. The authors observe that Yao’s Garbled
circuit [12], [13] which was originally designed for two-party
secure computation, can also perform a one-time verifiable
computation of arbitrary functions. In order to make the circuit
reusable, the authors encode the inputs to the circuit with Fully
Homomorphic Encryption (FHE). But due to this reliance
on FHE, this algorithm is of limited practical interest. An
alternative approach is proposed in [6], where the authors
represent an arbitrary C code as an arithmetic circuit, which
is then converted into a Quadratic Arithmetic Program (QAP)
[7]. In simple words, the server first evaluates the circuit,
which provides the required coefficients for the QAP. He will
then generate a proof by evaluating the QAP at a secret value,
“in the exponent”. With the help of a bilinear map, the user
can check the correctness of the results in constant time by
verifying that the returned values satisfy a certain identity.
Other works in the literature focus on the verifiable compu-
tation of specific functions, such as matrix multiplication [14],
modular exponentiation [15] and polynomial evaluation [2],
[9], [16], [8]. By sacrificing the generality of the algorithm,
this line of research aims at designing verifiable computation
schemes which are efficient and practical.
We will now describe in more details some of the al-
gorithms which are specifically designed for polynomial
evaluation. In [2] the authors present one of the first effi-
cient verifiable polynomial evaluation algorithms. Put simply,
the server is provided with two vectors [a0, . . . , ak−1] and
[gca0+r0 , . . . , gcak−1+rk−1 ] where g is a generator of the field
and [r0, . . . , rk−1] is a pseudorandom sequence which satisfies
2As discussed in Section II-A, we assume that n can be neglected compared
to k. As a result, the first term in O(k/n+ cn
√
k) is dominant.
the closed form efficiency property. This property implies that
the user can compute r(x) = r0 + r1x + · · · + rk−1xk−1
in sublinear time in k. Subsequently, once the server returns
both f(x) = a0 + a1x + · · · + ak−1xk−1, and h(x) =
gca0+r0+(ca1+r1)x+···+(cak−1+rk−1)x
k−1
the user can easily
check whether h(x) = gcf(x)+r(x). The complexity of the
user under this assumption is O(log(k)).
The algorithm presented in [2] is only verifiable by the user.
In [9] the authors present a modification of this algorithm
which admits public verifiability. In this case, the user provides
a public verification key that any third party can use to check
the correctness of the computation.
The authors in [8] suggest that the user starts by generating
a polynomial b(x) = x2 + b0 where b0 is uniformly random
over the field. The user then divides f(x) by g(x) to find
the quotient q(x) = q0 + q1x + · · · + qk−3xk−3 and the
remainder r(x) = r0+ r1x such that f(x) = b(x)q(x)+ r(x).
The server is provided with the two vectors [a0, . . . , ak−1]
and [gq0 , . . . , gqk−3 ] and is asked to compute f(x) and gq(x).
Upon receiving these two values, the user can check whether
gf(x) = (gq(x))b(x)gr(x) in constant time. This algorithm is
also publicly verifiable.
By comparison to the works mentioned above, INTERPOL
stands out in that it is information-theoretic and relies on no
cryptographic assumption. The verification time of INTER-
POL is O(c
√
k) where k is the degree of the polynomial.
Despite being significantly more efficient than performing the
original computation, INTERPOL has the disadvantage of
being slower than the existing cryptographic works which are
specifically tailored to polynomial evaluation and typically run
in log(k) or even constant time.
In the remaining of the paper, we represent random variables
with capital letters and their realizations with lower case
letters. We reserve bold font for vectors and regular font for
scalars. Finally, we represent all the matrices with capital
Greek alphabet.
IV. DESCRIPTION OF INTERPOL AND PROOF OF
THEOREM 1
In this section we describe INTERPOL for polynomial
evaluation in a user-server setup. Suppose the user wishes to
evaluate f(x) = a0+a1x+ . . . ak−1x
k−1 at some input value
x. For simplicity assume that k = s2. The algorithm can easily
be generalized to the case when k is not a complete square.
Consider the vector [a0, . . . , ak−1]. Break this vector down
into s consecutive chunks of length s each, and rename the
elements as follows: ai,j = ai×s+j for i ∈ [0 : s − 1] and
j ∈ [0 : s− 1]. Define the s × s matrix ∆ as ∆ = [ai,j ]. We
can now write
f(x) =
[
1 xs . . . xs(s−1)
]
∆
[
1 x . . . xs−1
]T
.
The user delegates the computation of b :=
∆
[
1 x . . . xs−1
]T
to the server following an
algorithm that we will describe shortly. After this phase,
the user computes f(x) =
[
1 xs . . . xs(s−1)
]
b. Note
that this can be done in O(s) since each element of
[
1 xs . . . xs(s−1)
]
can be computed in constant time3,
(except xs which can be computed in log(s)). If the user can
verify and recover the value of b in complexity O(cs) for
some constant c, the overall complexity of the user will be
O(c
√
k). We will now show how to accomplish this.
Consider a general problem of verifiable matrix-vector
multiplication. Suppose the user intends to find ∆z where ∆
is a square s × s matrix and z is a column vector. The user
starts by choosing a constant c > 0. As we will see soon, a
larger c implies a higher complexity for the user, but results
in an enhanced security. The user generates a random c × s
matrix Λ of uniform i.i.d. elements over the field. The user
then performs a one-time computation of Γ = Λ∆.
Note that this requires O(cs2) computation. This may seem
substantial at first, but one should note that this cost will be
amortized, since the user does not need to update Γ for every
input vector z.
The user keeps Λ and Γ as secret. He simply reveals ∆
and z to the server and asks him to compute w = ∆z. After
receiving wˆ from the server, the user checks whether Λwˆ =
Γz. Note that both Λwˆ and Γz can be computed in O(cs)
which is sublinear in the complexity of computing∆z directly.
If the equality Λwˆ = Γz holds, the user accepts wˆ as
the result of ∆z. Otherwise, an error is declared and the
verification process fails. This process has been summarized
in Algorithm 1. In order to prove Theorem 1, we propose the
following lemma.
Lemma 1. INTERPOL achieves the correctness and
(information-theoretic) soundness properties defined in Section
II, with parameter P = q−c, C = O(c
√
k) and cf˜ = O(k).
The statements regarding the complexity and the correctness
of INTERPOL can be readily established. We will now prove
the soundness property of the algorithm.
A. Proof of Soundness
Suppose that the server returns wˆ 6= w where wˆ is an
arbitrary (possibly randomized) function of ∆ and z. Our goal
is to prove that wˆ only passes the verification check at the user
with a negligible probability. More specifically, we have the
following lemma.
Lemma 2. Assume ∆ ∈ Fs×sq and z ∈ Fsq and let Λ be a
random matrix uniformly distributed over Fc×sq . Define Γ =
Λ∆ and w = ∆z. Let W be a random variable over Fsq,
independent of Λ, with an arbitrary distribution pW. We have
P(ΛW = Γz ,W 6= w) ≤ q−c. (7)
3The j’th element of the vector can be computed by one multiplication
x(j−1)s = x(j−2)sxs, since x(j−2)s and xs have been previously com-
puted.
Proof:
P(ΛW = Γz,W 6= w) (8)
= P(Λ(W −w) = 0,W 6= w) (9)
=
∑
y∈Fsq,y 6=0
P(Λy = 0)P(W = w + y) (10)
=
∑
y∈Fsq,y 6=0
q−cP(W = w + y) ≤ q−c (11)
where the last line follows from the fact that Λy ∼ unif(Fsq)
for any y ∈ Fsq, y 6= 0. Furthermore, we can omit the
conditioning in the third line due to the fact that Λ is
independent of W.
Algorithm 1 INTERPOL: User-Server Setup
Input: Vector [a0, . . . , ak−1] and input vector x
Output: Verification and decoding vectors ver,dec.
Initialization:
1: Define ∆ = [ai,j ]s×s where ai,j = ais+j .
2: Generate random matrix Λ ∈ Fc×sq and compute Γ = Λ∆.
3: Reveal ∆ to the server.
4: for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , size(x)} do
5: Reveal x = xi to the server.
6: Ask server to compute w = ∆
[
1 x . . . xs−1
]
.
7: Receive wˆ from server.
8: veri = 1
(
∆wˆ = Γ
[
1 x . . . xs−1
])
.
9: deci =
[
1 xs . . . xs(s−1)
]
wˆ.
10: end for
11: Return ver,dec.
B. Adaptivity of INTERPOL
So far we assumed that the user does not disclose the
information about whether or not the results returned by
the server are accepted. In certain circumstances it may be
necessary to reveal this information publicly, for instance
to nullify a contract between the user and the server. The
question that we intend to address in this section is whether
an adversarial server can exploit this information in order to
increase his likelihood of bypassing the verification test in the
subsequent rounds of computation. The short answer to this
question is “yes, but only marginally”.
To give a formal answer, consider a setup wherem consecutive
queries are made to a server. After each query, the user reveals
to him whether his response has been accepted or rejected. We
then ask what is the probability that the adversarial server
can pass the verification test with a false result at least
once in the m rounds of interaction. As a benchmark, also
consider a secondary server who receives no feedback about
the verification process and who returns m random outputs in
response to the m queries. The probability that this server can
bypass the verification test at least once in m rounds is given
by 1− (1− 1qc )m. We will show that our primary server who
relies on the previous verification results can at most increase
this probability to mqc .
Theorem 3. Suppose that we rely on INTERPOL to delegate
the computation of a polynomial f(x) of degree k − 1 to a
server form different inputs x ∈ {x1, . . . , xm}. Them queries
are made sequentially, and the output of the verification
function is revealed publicly after each round. We have
PL = P(∃ℓ ∈ [m] s.t. verℓ = 1, decℓ 6= f(xℓ)) ≤ m
qc
.
The proof of this theorem follows immediately from the
next Lemma, which we will prove in Appendix A.
Lemma 3. Assume ∆ ∈ Fs×sq and z1, . . . , zm ∈ Fsq and let Λ
be a random matrix uniformly distributed over Fc×sq . Define
Γ = Λ∆ and wℓ = ∆zℓ, ℓ ∈ [m]. Let Wℓ, ℓ ∈ [m] be m
random variables satisfying the Markov chain
Λ←→ (V1, . . . , Vℓ−1)←→ Wℓ
where Vℓ = 1(ΛWℓ = Γzℓ). We have
P(∃ℓ ∈ [m] s.t. Vℓ = 1,Wℓ 6= wℓ) ≤ m
qc
.
V. DESCRIPTION OF MULTI-PARTY INTERPOL AND
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Similar to the user-server setup, we define ∆ as the s × s
matrix where ai,j = ai×s+j . Furthermore, we define∆j as the
submatrix of ∆ which consists of rows { s(j−1)n , . . . , sjn − 1}.
The algorithm works as follows.
Each node ℓ generates a set of n − 1 random matrices
Λℓ,j ∈ Fc×
s
n
q and performs a one-time computation of
Γℓ,j = Λℓ,j∆j , j ∈ [n]\{ℓ}. At each round of the
algorithm, each node j will be in charge of computing
wj = ∆j
[
1 x . . . xs−1
]
which can be done in O( s
2
n ).
The result of these computations are broadcast to the network.
Once node ℓ receives wˆ[n]\{ℓ}, he verifies the correctness
of each wˆj by checking whether Γℓ,j
[
1 x . . . xs−1
]
=
Λℓ,jwˆj . Each of these verifications can be done in O(
cs
n ).
Finally, assuming that all the verifications pass, node ℓ re-
covers f(x) =
[
1 xs . . . xs(s−1)
] [
wˆT1 . . . wˆ
T
n
]T
. The
overall complexity of this algorithm is O( s
2
n + csn + s) per
node where the first term is the complexity of computing
∆ℓ
[
1 x . . . xs−1
]
(as server), the second term is the
complexity of performing the n − 1 verifications and the
last term is the complexity of recovering f(x). Compared
to a naive algorithm where each node individually computes
f(x), this algorithm is Θ(n) times faster, assuming that the
number of nodes in the network is substantially smaller than
s. This procedure has been summarized in Algorithm 2. The
performance of this algorithm is characterized in the next
lemma which can be proven similarly to Lemma 1. Theorem
2 follows immediately.
Lemma 4. Multi-party INTERPOL achieves the correctness
and (information-theoretic) soundness properties defined in
Section II-A, with parameter P = q−c and C = O( kn+cn
√
k).
Algorithm 2 INTERPOL: Multi-party Setup (algorithm ran
by node ℓ ∈ [n]).
Input: Vector [a0, . . . , ak−1] and input vector x
Output: Verification matrix and decoding vector
VER,dec
Initialization:
1: Define ∆ = [ai,j ]s×s where ai,j = ais+j .
2: Define ∆j as submatrice of ∆ consisting of rows
s(j−1)
n , . . . ,
sj
n − 1 for j ∈ [n].
3: Generate n − 1 random matrices Λℓ,j ∈ Fc×
s
n
q , j ∈
[n]\{ℓ}.
4: Compute Γℓ,j = Λj∆ℓ,j , j ∈ [n]\{ℓ}.
5: for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , size(x)} do
6: Let x = xi.
As Server:
7: Compute wℓ = ∆ℓ
[
1 x . . . xs−1
]
.
8: Broadcast wℓ to every other node.
As User:
9: for j ∈ [n]\{ℓ} do
10: Receive wˆj from server j.
11: VERi,j = 1
(
Λℓ,jwˆj = Γℓ,j
[
1 xi . . . x
s−1
i
])
.
12: end for
13: deci =
[
1 xsi . . . x
s(s−1)
i
] [
wˆT1 . . . wˆ
T
n
]T
.
14: end for
15: Return VER,dec.
Given that multi-party INTERPOL is a straightforward
generalization of user-server INTERPOL, it is not hard to
see that it also preserves the adaptivity feature. We omit this
analysis for conciseness.
A. Enabling Error Correction in the Multi-party Setting
As suggested in Section III, in the multi-party setting
the network can dynamically remove the malicious nodes
and repeat the computation that was assigned to them. An
alternative approach to redoing the computation is to use
erasure coding. Specifically, in Algorithm 2, we can divide
the matrix ∆ into k horizontal sub-matrices, and apply an
(n, k) Reed-Solomon code to these submatrices to obtain
{∆˜1, ∆˜2, . . . , ∆˜n}. We can then assign the task of computing
∆˜ℓ
[
1 x . . . xs−1
]
to node ℓ. This approach increases the
overall complexity of each node by a factor of nk . However,
in the presence of up to n − k malicious nodes, each node
can recover all ∆˜ℓ
[
1 x . . . xs−1
]
efficiently, thanks to
the fast-decodability of RS codes. To appreciate the role of
INTERPOL, note that in the absence of a verification mecha-
nism, the same algorithm would only tolerate ⌈n−k+12 ⌉ − 1
errors (albeit in a deterministic fashion). With the help of
INTERPOL, we can locate the errors, thereby increase the
tolerance against malicious servers by a factor of 2.
VI. GENERALIZATION TO MULTIVARIATE POLYNOMIALS
Consider the following m-variate polynomial which is of
degree n− 1 in each variable.
f(x1, . . . , xm) =
∑
d1∈[0:n−1],...,dm∈[0:n−1]
ad1,...,dm
m∏
i=1
xdii .
(12)
Evaluating this polynomial can be done in time linear in the
number of non-zero terms, which in the worst case scenario is
O(nm). Suppose for simplicity that m is even. We will pro-
pose an extension of INTERPOL that reduces the complexity
of the user to O(n
m
2 ). We start by partitioning the set of vari-
ables into two sets {x1, . . . , xm/2} and {xm/2+1, . . . , xm}.
We can rewrite f(x1, . . . , xm) as
f(x1, . . . , xm) = x
T
0 ∆x1 (13)
where each x0 and x1 is a vertical vector of length (n
m
2 ) and
xℓ[i] =
m/2∏
j=1
x
bi,j
j+ℓm/2, ∀i ∈ [0 : n
m
2 − 1], ℓ ∈ [0 : 1], (14)
where [bi,1, . . . , bi,m/2] is the n-ary expansion of i. Further-
more, ∆ is an nm/2 × nm/2 matrix whose elements are
∆ij = adi,j (15)
where di,j := [bi,1, . . . , bi,m/2, bj,1, . . . , bj,m/2].
The user can now perform a one-time heavy computation
of Γ = Λ∆ where Λ is a secret c × nm/2 matrix uniformly
generated at random over the field. The user delegates the
computation of w = ∆x1 to the server. After receiving wˆ, he
can check whether Λwˆ = Γx1. Once the verification process
has passed, the user will compute f(x1, . . . , xm) = x
T
0 w. The
complexity of the user will be O(nm/2) while the complexity
of the server remains O(nm).
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APPENDIX A: PROOF OF LEMMA 3
Without loss of generality, suppose the adversarial server
chooses Wℓ = wℓ + Yℓ where Yℓ is an arbitrary random
variable defined over F sq \{0} which satisfies the Markov chain
Λ←→ (V1, . . . , Vℓ−1)←→ Yℓ (16)
where Vℓ = 1(ΛYℓ = 0). We can compute
pm := P(V1 = 0, . . . , Vm = 0)
= P(ΛYm 6= 0, . . . ,ΛY1 6= 0)
= P(ΛYm 6= 0|ΛYm−1 6= 0, . . . ,ΛY1 6= 0)
× P(ΛYm−1 6= 0, . . . ,ΛY1 6= 0).
Let us bound the first term.
tm := P(ΛYm 6= 0|ΛYm−1 6= 0, . . . ,ΛY1 6= 0)
=
∑
ym 6=0
P(ΛYm 6= 0|Ym = ym,ΛYm−1 6= 0 . . . ,
ΛY1 6= 0)× P(Ym = ym|ΛYm−1 6= 0, . . . ,ΛY1 6= 0)
=
∑
ym 6=0
P(Λym 6= 0|ΛYm−1 6= 0, . . . ,ΛY1 6= 0)
× P(Ym = ym|ΛYm−1 6= 0, . . . ,ΛY1 6= 0)
where the last equality follows from the Markov chain property
(16). We proceed by proposing a bound on the term P(Λym 6=
0|ΛYm−1 6= 0, . . . ,ΛY1 6= 0) that holds for any ym 6= 0.
rm := P(Λym 6= 0|ΛYm−1 6= 0, . . . ,ΛY1 6= 0)
= 1− P(Λym = 0|ΛYm−1 6= 0, . . . ,ΛY1 6= 0)
= 1− P(Λym = 0,ΛYm−1 6= 0, . . . ,ΛY1 6= 0)
P(ΛYm−1 6= 0, . . . ,ΛY1 6= 0)
≥ 1− P(Λym = 0)
P(ΛYm−1 6= 0, . . . ,ΛY1 6= 0)
= 1− 1
qcP(ΛYm−1 6= 0, . . . ,ΛY1 6= 0) .
We can now continue with lower-bounding tm as
tm ≥
∑
ym 6=0
(
1− 1
qcP(ΛYm−1 6= 0, . . . ,ΛY1 6= 0)
)
× P(Ym = ym|ΛYm−1 6= 0, . . . ,ΛY1 6= 0)
= 1− 1
qcP(ΛYm−1 6= 0, . . . ,ΛY1 6= 0) .
Finally, we can lower-bound pm as
pm ≥ (1− 1
qcP(ΛYm−1 6= 0, . . . ,ΛY1 6= 0) )
× P(ΛYm−1 6= 0, . . . ,ΛY1 6= 0)
= pm−1 − 1
qc
.
This recursion and the fact that p1 ≥ 1 − 1qc result in our
desired bound pm ≥ 1− mqc .
